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I. INTRODUCTION
Recent studies by the General Accounting Office (GAO) have shown
that many federal agencies are operating outmoded automatic data
processing equipment. Over half the 1,366 medium and large scale
computers in use at federal agencies are over ten years old and two or
more computer generations behind current technology [l:l]. Investiga-
tions for GAO cite the current acquisition cycle, which is long,
complicated and frustrating as a major contributor to the obsolescence
of federal computers.
The federal procurement process has historically favored free and
open competition to ensure the Government receives required supplies
and services at fair and reasonable prices. This policy presents
problems for federal agencies who wish to replace an inadequate computer
system. If the agency acquires a larger, compatible computer from the
same manufacturer on a sole source basis, other manufacturers are denied
an opportunity to compete. On the other hand, if competition is held,
the agency may face substantial effort, high costs, and operational
disruption to convert its software programs to run on the new equip-
ment [2:1]. Conversion costs of operating programs include:
1) labor costs for rewriting the program code
2) changing the programs supporting documentation
3) converting the data files
k) conducting program and system testing
5) costs of dual equipment operation during conversion
6) opportunity costs associated with applying resources
to conversion rather than to new tasks
7) retraining personnel on new computer
8) costs of any necessary site modification

In this thesis the federal computer acquisition process is
examined by studying one particular major computer system acquisition.
The manner in which the principals involved conducted the acquisition
in relation to the political and regulatory environment is examined
and displayed in a case study format. Insightful conclusions about
the process in general can be drawn from the facts presented in this
single point research exercise.
The case study was developed from retained contract files and
personal interviews with individuals actively involved in the acquisi-
tion of a replacement computer system for the Naval Postgraduate
School. This acquisition was chosen for study because it was a major
system acquisition (total costs 9.9 million dollars) still small
enough to be studied in depth. The process of replacing the obsolete
computer involved several important and controversial issues which
ultimately led to a protest of the procurement zo the General
Accounting Office.
It is intended that the case study which is presented in chapter
two, along with the teaching note presented in chapter three, be
utilized in graduate or undergraduate level courses in computer
systems management, acquisition contract management, marketing
management and management policy. The case introduces the student
to the Federal Government's computer acquisition process, and should
provide insight to marketing strategies involved in the procurement of
new equipment. Students analyzing the case should gain a new per-
spective into the difficult issues which are encountered when an
organization wishes to replace an aging, inadequate major computer system.
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II. A CASE STUDY
This chapter contains a case study intended for use in classroom
discussion. It is illustrative of important aspects of computer
acquisition strategy and procedures.

THE NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL COMPUTER ACQUISITION
In June 1980, Mr. Robert Johnson, the Assistant Commissioner For
Policy and Planning at the General Services Administration (GSA), was
reviewing his decision on whether or not to revoke the Navy's Delegation
of Procurement Authority (DPA) for the acquisition of a computer system
at the Naval Postgraduate School. He would have to announce his
decision immediately because the acquisition process was in its late
stages and the Navy was about to award a contract. He had at most two
days to take action.
He knew that revoking the DPA would surely bring forth a wave of
criticism that GSA's "second guessing" was making it impossible for
federal agencies to maintain an up to date computer inventory. The
uproar resulting from his most recent DPA revocation, a non-competitive
procurement being carried out by zhe Environmental Protection Agency,
was still sharp in his mind. However, he knew that allowing the Navy
acquisition to continue would be criticized as a further example of
GSA's "rubber stamping" an agency's non- competitive practices. Worse
This case was prepared by LCDR J. E. Boyle, 3.C., USN under the
supervision of CMDR M.L. Sneiderman, S.C., USN, and Professor C.R.
Jones. It is based on personal interviews and materials made avail-
able by the U.S. Navy Automatic Data Processing Selection Office. It
is intended for use as a basis for class discussion rather than to




yet, he might very well be summoned to explain his decision to the
House of Representatives Committee on Government Operations, a long time
advocate of maximum competition in federal computer acquisitions.
Johnson had spent a great deal of time in the past few days
becoming familiar with the facts surrounding this acquisition. His
staff had compiled a case history of the acquisition which traced its
progress over the last three years. He had found this history very
revealing and wanted to review it one last time before announcing his
decision.
RECOGNIZING THE NEED
In the Spring of 1977 the Naval Postgraduate school formed an ad
hoc future planning committee to begin the process of replacing the
existing IBM 360/67 system. The committee evolved from the school's
formal Computer Resources Board in recognition of the growing in-
adequacy of the installed system. The committee was tasked with de-
termining the needs and requirements for computer support for the future.
The Postgraduate School was proud of the degree of computer in-
volvement by its students and faculty. Curricula programs were
purposely developed around extensive use of the computer facilities,
and student thesis research was heavily computer dependent. One mem-
ber of the ad hoc committee stated:
"it became obvious to us that the computer had so permeated the
the educational fabric of the school that whatever option we
decided upon it had to be that option which provided the best
system with minimum disruption of the ongoing educational pro-
cess. A serious degradation of the quality of education
would result if the computer facilities were to be unavailable




The committee's review showed that the increasing present and
projected workload far exceeded the capabilities of the current system.
The School had bought this system in 19o7. At that time it was considered
a landmark machine for it had special hardware and software to facilitate
general-purpose, time sharing operation. Ten years later the machine was
far behind the 'state of art' distributed network systems.
Upgrading the IBM 360/67 was deemed inadvisable because it was
outmoded both technologically and operationally. It was a third genera-
tion computer with early-sixties technology and IBM would shortly be
dropping all support of the major operating system software. It was
aging and increasingly difficult and expensive to maintain. The eleven
years of continuous operation was finally wearing out key components and
cables. Maintenance costs were rapidly increasing and computer down
time was becoming a major problem.
Complicating the maintenance problem was the wide mix of vendor's
equipment utilized to make up the complete system. In many instances
it was difficult to determine which vendor's equipment was causing a
problem. Professor Doug Williams, the director of the computer center,
complained, "Maintenance and equipment troubleshooting were becoming a
major drain on my two group supervisor's time. We were not staffed to
support any maintenance functions and we could not afford to pay
service call charges to several different vendors. It was therefore
necessary for us to narrow the possible problem areas before contacting
a vendor. An unfortunate cost of this procedure was that my super-





The IBM 360/67 was also inadequate in computing power and
processor storage capacity. The increasingly complex research
techniques common to many educational and research institutions
which were pioneered on newer generation machines could not be
effectively or efficiently run on the 360/67. The system also had an
unbalanced configuration due to saturation of existing input/output
channels and was restricted in its telecommunications support because of
its requirement for hardwired controllers.
In the late Fall of 1977 the committee summarized its findings in a
report to the school's 3oard of Advisors. The Board in turn recommended
quick action to begin required work to effect major changes to the NPS
computing system. Key among the boards comments was,
"Whether an upgrading of the current hardware system is made,
or a computer replacement purchased, software conversion
requirements must be recognized. The Board notes that the
current NPS software system is a unique resource, and every
attempt should be made to maintain its usability on the new
system without incurring extraordinary conversion costs."
THE ROLE OF THE GSA
On Ik October 1977 Professor Williams was formally designated by
the School's Provost as the individual in charge of procuring the
future computer system. Doug was uniquely qualified not only because
of his technical expertise but also because of his intimate involve-
ment in the acquisition of the IBM 360/67 ten years earlier. This
experience had left him with an understanding of the complicated re-
lationships that existed not only within the Navy but also between
the Navy and the General Services Administration.

The Brooks Bill (P.L. 89-306) had consolidated authority for the
acquisition of automatic data processing equipment (ADPE) under the
General Services Administration (GSA). The bill gave GSA the authority
to acquire, operate, fund, and dispose of ADPE for the entire Federal
Government. However, GSA was not to "impair or interfere with the
determination by agencies of their individual requirements." Over the
years, close review of ADPE acquisitions by the House Government Opera-
tions Committee chaired by Congressman Jack Brooks (D. Texas) had
forced GSA to carefully review all ADPE actions to insure maximum
competition was possible, given the agency's requirement. The over-
riding requirement for maximum competition had effectively eliminated the
consideration of software conversion costs when evaluating a vendor whose
equipment was not able to run existing software.
Although charged with acquiring all general purpose ADPE for the
Federal Government, GSA had never been provided with sufficient person-
nel to accomplish this task. As a result, over ninety percent of ADPE
acquisitions were accomplished by the requiring agency through a Delega-
tion of Procurement Authority (DPA) from GSA. The wording of this DPA
was critical as to what type of systems and what costs could be
considered in proposal evaluation by the requesting agency. GSA
maintained control of the procurement process by closely monitoring
agency compliance with the DPA. Violation of any terms of the DPA
could result in GSA recinding it.
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ADPE ACQUISITION IN THE NAVY
ADPE procurement in the Department of the Navy is accomplished
under the auspices of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Financial
Management. (ASN(FM)). Although he must ultimately approve all major
ADPE acquisitions the ASN(FM) maintains only a small ADPE staff. The
major portion of justification and acquisition is the responsibility of
the Naval Data Automation Command. (NAVDAC). This command is tasked
with administering and coordinating the Navy Non-Tactical Automatic
Data Processing Program. This responsibility includes collaboration on
ADP matters with all ADP users; development of policy and procedures;
approval of systems development; sponsoring of ADP technology; and
career development and training of ADP personnel.
The Automatic Data Processing Selection Office (ADPSO) is tasked
with accomplishing the actual selection and acquisition of ADP resources
ADPSO predates NAVDAC as an organization being established in 19o7 to
provide the Navy a full time organization with expertise in the areas
of specification development and ADP selection and acquisition.
GAINING APPROVAL OF NEEDS
In January 1978 Doug Williams made initial contact with personnel
at NAVDAC to begin the formal process to replace the IBM 360/67. As a
result of these contacts a systems analyst from NAVDAC conducted a
fact finding trip to the Postgraduate School in early February 1978.
The analyst concurred in the findings previously reported by the
faculty future planning committee and recommended that these findings
be formally submitted to the NAVDAC in the form of an Automated
Ik

Data System Plan. The ADS plan in turn would provide the basis for a
request for a delegation of procurement authority from GSA.
Originally NAVDAC had proposed to send a team of personnel to
assist the school in developing the ADS plan but this help was turned
down. Doug Williams commented, "I had worked with those people for
several years and just felt that we could do a better job ourselves.
Besides I knew how overworked they were and they would just not be
able to give us the priority I thought we needed.
"
Discussions with the analyst centered around justifying the require-
ment for a replacement system which allowed continued use of the Post-
graduate School's extensive software resources. It was estimated at that
time that the replacement system would cost 6.5 million dollars to pur-
chase or 1.3 million dollars per year to lease if done on a plug to
plug software compatible basis. This estimate of cost was necessary
in order to provide a funding figure to enter the Navy's budgeting
cycle for fiscal year I98O which was nearing its final stages.
Getting funds for the NPS computer would require high level in-
volvement due to its submission in such a late stage of the Five Year
Planning and Budgeting System used in the Department of Defense. Ob-
taining this support required the dedicated involvement of the school's
Provost. The Provost, as the key civilian spokesman for the school
and as a member of many committees and study groups, had frequent
interactions with high placed managers and educational sponsors within
the Navy and Department of Defense. These managers /sponsors had vested
interest in the quality of educational support provided by the school.
15

Sponsors provided the input to various curricula taught at the school
and research efforts so that the graduate would have a practical payback
to blend with the theoretical concepts. One such sponsor was the
Commander of NAVDAC, who placed a guiding hand on the computer science
curriculum and found officers with masters level skills ready for in-
duction into NAVDAC. The Postgraduate School computer was also used by
the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC). The personnel data base
maintained by DMDC was essential to justify and analyze defense manpower
costs. The relationship with DMDC provided a champion for the budget
request in the person of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower,
Reserve Affairs and Logistics. The Provost ensured that the school's
computer requirement remained highly visible to these officials by
taking every opportunity, during phone calls and meetings, to keep them
aware of progress made.
In order to obtain a reliable planning figure for the Provost to
work with the computer planning committee had designated suitable combi-
nations of various manufacturers' systems and priced these using prices
quoted in GSA ADPE catalogs. Each proposed system was required to have
the following capabilities:
1) 10 times present CPU power
2) h times processor storage (6-8 MBYTES)
3) more i/O channels
k) large capacity disk storage (^00 MBYTES/spindie)
5) one single, integrated operating system
In order to confirm that their estimates of costs were accurate the
planning committee invited on 30 March 1978 interested vendors to
submit informal estimates of what they thought would be a suitable
16

system given the stated requirements. Estimates later received from
the vendors confirmed the budget planning figure.
Utilizing the information obtained from their own efforts and those
of the vendors responding to the informal request for information, the
computer planning committee began compiling the various economic analysis,
workload analysis, and impact statements required for the postgraduate
school's Automated Data System Plan. Finally in August 1978 the ADS
plan was completed and forwarded on to ITAVDAC for ultimate approval by
the ASN(FM).
Upon receipt of the Postgraduate School's ADS plan NAVDAG began its
review to ensure the analysis was proper and dependable. The Post-
graduate School had been quite successful thus far in gaining funding
approval for the computer acquisition. The school's Provoso had
established the legitimacy of the computer requirement and funding in
Fiscal Year 1980 seemed assured. However, the funds were deleted in
late December 1978 ^ust prior to the submission of the DOD budget. The
loss of funding support threatened to significantly delay processing of
the Postgraduate School's request as it would now be put "on a back
burner" at NAVDAC. The Provost quickly marshalled the school's sup-
porters to reestablish funding credibility and, on 19 January 1979? the
commander of NAVDAG issued a memo directing his people to "not hold up
processing the PG School ADPE request."
In the Spring of 1979 Doug Williams was under great pressure from
the Provost who was unhappy with the seemingly endless delay on the
approval of the ADS plan. The Provost directed Doug to go to
17

Washington and get the process moving. At first it was difficult to
determine what was causing the delay. Eventually the Provost inter-
ceded and was informed by the commander of NAVDAC that one key in-
dividual had misgivings about the validity of the projected workload.
Once this problem was surfaced Doug was able to quickly develop addi-
tional justification for inclusion in the ADS plan. On 20 April 1979
final approval of the ADS plan was obtained from the ASN(FM) and a
Delegation of Procurement Authority was requested from GSA.
THE DELEGATION OF PROCUREMENT AUTHORITY (DPA)
By the administrative guidlines GSA has twenty days in which to
act upon an agency's request for a DPA. By custom GSA will often ask
for additional information on a DPA request in order to extend the
twenty day limit. The requirement to include software conversion costs
in the NPS procurement ran into immediate resistance from GSA, who re-
quested additional information and stopped the twenty day time clock.
On 18 May 1979 representatives of the Navy and GSA met to review
the positions developing in the respective procurement approaches. The
GSA position favored a fully competitive procurement which allowed all
vendors an opportunity to compete. The GSA proposed DPA would allow a
fully competitive solicitation in which any required software conversion
(estimated at 3.7 million dollars) would have to be absorbed by the
vendor. The Navy had requested a DPA to enter into a competitive
solicitation that would be capable of processing the current software
without conversion. This, in effect, would limit the competition to
IBM compatible computers. (i.e. IBM, AMDAHL, ITEL, CDC and others).
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The Navy maintained that the GSA approach would be more costly to
the government both in time and dollar costs due to the following
factors
:
a) software conversion costs
The cost to document the existing software library so
that a new non- compatible vendor could consider a con-
version bid was estimated at 250,000 dollars minimum
and six months.
b) operational inefficiencies
The delay of one to one and a half years of the GSA
approach would prove detrimental to the NPGS mission and
to the customers supported by this computer system.
c) hardware requirements preparation
The Navy's cost and time required to develop a more
definitive specification to spell out processing
requirements and standards in order to accommodate
new non- compatible vendors would be high.
Additionally the Navy felt that the GSA approach, while fully competi-
tive on the surface, placed such unreasonable requirements on the vendor
that few would respond. It was questionable whether responsible vendors
would or could compete for a 6.5 million dollars total contract if they
had to cover 3.7 million dollars in conversion cost. In order to provide
substantive answers to some GSA concerns, the Navy agreed to have foot
Doug Williams brief the key GSA decision makers on the Navy's approach.
A Navy memorandum recording the issues discussed at the meeting
added:
"After the meeting, at GSA's suggestion, we contacted the
Federal Communications Commission as to their experience
with the GSA approach recommended here. FCC had a similar
situation and had requested an IBM compatible DPA to retain
its present software. GSA insisted that FCC go fully compe-
titive and require the vendors to absorb any conversion
cost. It was implied in GSA that this had been a completely
19

successful effort. However, a FCC representative reports
utter disaster. The FCC solicitation is now under pro-
test by CDC to have the conversion package thrown out of
the RFP. If that protest is successful, the contract
will be based on equipment costs alone. After more than
four years the representative said FCC is no closer to a
computer than when they started."
Doug, now aware of the ongoing problem at the Federal Communica-
tions Commission, prepared his oresentation. The presentation
focused on obtaining maximum practical competition while striving for
least total overall cost. It pointed out the magnitude of the actual
costs of conversion which included:
a) Rewriting of documentation and instructional
materials generated over the previous twelve
years.
b) Contractor/user coordination problems.
c) The requirement to establish a site for live
parallel operations so that converted software
was tested under live conditions.
d) Recent experience at other government sites
which had shown that conversion costs could
be as much as six times greater than original
estimates.
e) Waste of student and faculty time while debugging
"converted programs."
Many of these costs were not quantifiable and were not permissible
considerations in contract awards and therefore could not be
considered in evaluation of vendor proposals. They did however
represent real costs to be bourne by the Navy which would not be
required under the more limited competitive approach requested. In
light of the high costs described, Doug felt it was highly unlikely
that the fully competitive approach would be the least cost alternative,
20

Professor Williams left the meeting feeling confident that he had
provided a convincing presentation for the GSA representatives.
Subsequent discussions between the NPS Provost and the head of
the General Services Administration pointed out GSA's doubts about
the validity of the conversion costs cited by the Navy. GSA was
reluctant to grant the requested DPA until they could verify these
costs. The Provost was concerned that further delay would jeopardize
the established budget support. He therefore directed Professor Williams
to arrange for conversion costs to be estimated by a commercial con-
sulting group recommended by GSA. The consulting group, after a two
day study, determined that conversion could cost in excess of five
million dollars. The Navy delighted that this estimate strengthened
their case provided the study results to GSA in mid-July.
On 7 August 1979 the Navy was awarded a DPA for "the acquisi-
tion of a replacement system for an I EM 360/67 computer system located
at the Navy Postgraduate School. " The DPA went on to require competi-
tion "to the maximum extent practical" and recognized the requirement
"that all proposed systems be software compatible with the existing
systems and be capable of processing your existing inventory of soft-
ware without change." This delegation required the acquisition to be
consummated within twelve months. [See Exhibit l] On 31 August 1979
the Automatic Data Processing Selection Office received direction from




Although ADPSO exists to provide the Navy an organization with
expertise in specification development, it does so only in an advisory
capacity. The ma^or responsibility for specification development rests
with the user.
Anticipating approval of its acquisition strategy of maximum
practical competition, the Postgraduate School had been finalizing
required specifications and benchmark criteria during the summer of
1979. The Postgraduate School possessed unique resources in the area
of specification and benchmark development in that it had a distinguished
computer science and computer systems management faculty. The Provost
was therefore able to call upon four professors, each holding a
doctrate in the computer related fields, to serve with Professor
Williams on the specifications committee. This group was fully aware
of what was technically available in the marketplace and were intimately
involved and knowledgible of the basic requirements of the school. In
fact, the technical knowledge available to this group far exceeded the
capabilities of the personnel at ADPSO. ADPSO 's role became one of
questioning proposed specifications as being possibly too restrictive
and matters of format.
The specifications as developed proposed to obtain from a single
contractor a compatible large scale ADP system consisting of commercial
or modified commercial items, to replace the IBM 360/67. Mandatory
requirements included:

a) central processing unit(s)




f) manuals and documentation.
The general scope of the proposed system was described by
functional specifications. Precise models or quantities of equipment
required to meet the specifications and provide for expansion of the
system as workload increased were to be determined by the contractor.
The Benchmark Test would determine the equipment configuration, size
and quantities each offeror would need to meet the minimum specifica-
tions of the solicitation. Other items required for support (e.g.
software, maintenance, training and documentation) would be determined
2
by the hardware selected. The mandatory specifications contained
certain constraints in addition to the performance requirements set
forth in the benchmark. These constraints dealt with mandatory
Federal Information Processing Standards (FTPS), a requirement that
the new system be capable of running all present applications and
systems software without change, and be able to interface with existing
Government owned equipment. In addition to the mandatory requirements,
The Benchmark test is a live test demonstration utilizing
sample data to validate a proposed systems ability to accomplish a
required processing exercise.
2
Mandatory specifications are established by the Government as
being essential to meet the Government needs. When set forth in the
solicitation, the mandatory specifications must be met by an offer in
order for such an offer to be considered responsive to the solicitation,
23

three desirable features were described. It was not necessary for a
contractor to bid the desireable features in order for his proposal to
be responsive to the solicitation. However, if desireable features
were not bid certain set dollar values corresponding to the Government '
s
estimate of their worth would be added to the evaluated cost of the
proposal, constituting a penalty to that offeror.
THE BENCHMARK TEST
The benchmark test was designed to measure the ability of the
proposed equipment to process, at acceptable performance levels, the
initial and projected workloads for the Postgraduate School's computer
system. The test would be evaluated on a pass/fail basis.
The benchmark test was composed of three segments:
a) BATCH, test of batch-processing performance;
b) TEST 150, test of system performance under a
mixed workload of batch-processing, and inter-
active computing at 150 simultaneous terminals;
and
c) TEST 250, test under mixed load of batch-
processing and 250 interactive terminals.
It was designed to be a representative sample of the Postgraduate
School's workload. The first test, BATCH, would establish the
performance of the system on batch-processing work and provide a
base measurement for subsequent tests under mixed computing loads.
To pass the batch test the elapsed time from the beginning of the
first to the end of the last job must be less than thirty minutes.
Also the CPU Improvement Ratio for each job (as computed by comparing
2k

the stated IBM 360/67 CPU execution time to the CPU execution time for
the system being tested) must be a minimum of ten with a median value
for all ratios of twelve or more.
TEST 150 required that the system be able to execute the batch-
processing jobs while simultaneously interacting with 150 remote
terminals simulated by utilizing a Remote Terminal Emulator. The
interactive terminals would cycle through a script of commands repre-
sentative of normal NPS workload. To pass this portion of the benchmark
the system must be able to execute the batch jobs in less than three
times the original time determined in the BATCH test. Also response
time at the terminals would be measured and must meet requirements
set forth in the specifications. TEST 250 was included in the bench-
mark to demonstrate that the proposed initial system could grow to
accommodate the expected increase in workload over time. The offeror
was allowed to expand the initially proposed system if necessary to
accomplish TEST 250. System additions were required to be field-
installable on the system initially installed. TEST 250 was the same
as TEST 150 except that 250 remote terminals are to be emulated.
The methodology used to evaluate the benchmark test was as
follows
:
a) A Government team would verify that the offeror's
hardware and software is that proposed in the offeror's
response to the RFP.
b) The Government would compare the results of the offeror's
capability demonstration to results obtained earlier
at a government computer site. This validation would
be conducted for each phase of the demonstration and
would be graded on a pass/fail basis.
25

c) The Government team would review the inputs and out-
puts from the terminal emulation and make the required
calculations to determine if che proposed equipment met
the required response and turnaround times for time
sharing terminals as specified in the RFP.
EVALUATING PROPOSALS
The proposal evaluation system to be used involved two separate
review bodies, the Source Selection Evaluation 3oard (SSEB) and the
Source Selection Advisory Committee (SSAC). The function of the SSEB
was to review all proposals received in accordance with the evaluation
factors section of the solicitation document. This evaluation would be
conducted in four stages sequenced as follows:
a) technical acceptability
b) successful completion of benchmark
c) agreement as to terms and conditions
d) contract life cost
If it was determined by the SSEB that any offerors proposal was not
technically acceptable that proposal could be eliminated from any
further consideration. Only offerors whose proposals were technically
acceptable and passed the benchmark would be considered in the competi-
tive range and be asked for "best and Final" offers. A contract life
cost would then be developed for each remaining offeror based on costing
information submitted and considering all additional necessary costs to
the Government. Costs would be applied in the month they occur and would
be evaluated on "present value" analysis. The offeror evaluated and
3est and final offer is that offer which the contractor is
allowed to submit after negotiations which will be used as the basis
of evaluation for contract award.
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having the lowest contract life cost over the projected eight year
life of the system would be recommended for award.
The function of SSAC was to review and approve the solicitation
document and the evaluation plan and to recommend to the ASN(FM) which
offeror to award the contract. The SSAC was composed of relatively
senior personnel in comparison to the SSE3 and in general acted to
ensure the process remained unbiased.
The system's specifications for the solicitation document were
finalized in October 1979 • Letters of interest were mailed to 137
prospective contractors on 9 November 1979 and the announcement of
the solicitation was placed in the Commerce Business Daily on 20
November 1979* Thirty-two requests for solicitation documents were
received at ADPSO by 20 December 1979. Solicitation documents were
issued to the thirty-two requestors on 22 January 1980 with a deadline
for offers of 10 March I98O. On 2Q January 1980 copies of the Bench-
mark Test package were available for all interested parties.
THE COMPETITION
IBM Corporation and Federal Data Corporation (FDC) were the only
vendors to seriously pursue the NFS contract. FDC, a small firm located
in 'Chevy Chase, Maryland, functioned as an integrator of various vendor
products. In this case FDC proposed a system with the main equipment
(processor nucleus) from AMDAHL. FDC/aMDAHL expressed many questions
and concerns throughout the period from the receipt of the letters of
interest to the proposal due date. The first of nine letters received
at ADPSO from FDC/AMDAHL questioned the remote terminal emulation
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requirement for two hundred fifty terminals. Specifically FDC/AMDAHL
felt that this requirement would force them to be non-responsive to
the solicitation as they could not provide two hundred fifty terminals
at their benchmark test center. FDC/AMDAHL went on to provide various
alternative methods of testing the systems terminal capacity. Implied
in the letter was the thought that this requirement strongly favored
IBM due to their pioneering work in remote terminal emulation and
their extensive benchmark facilities.
On Ik February 1980 FDC/AMDAHL's second letter pointed out ad-
ditional issues which they felt were too restrictive. Most important
among these was the requirement for the system to present a single
system image to the user and operate with a single copy of the
operating system software. The letter requested a thirty day delay in
the bid submission date and suggested that FDC/AMDAHL and ADPSO conduct
a technical conference to discuss the issues raised. The technical
conference was held on 25 February 1980 and tentative agreement was
reached on the single system image issue. The next day FDC/AMDAHL
sent an additional letter to ADPSO summarizing their comments as a
result of the 25 February meeting. FDC/AMDAHL went on to pose four
specific questions as to the possible degree of involvement of IBM in
the development of the minimum performance requirements. FDC/AMDAHL's
analysis of the benchmark had shown that a single AMDAHL U7OV/8 CPU
could not meet the requirement even though it would increase NPS '
s
computing power in excess of ten times the t>ower of the IBM 360/67. It
was therefore FDC/AMDAHL's position that the benchmark was excessively
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restrictive. They went on further to state that they estimate costs
of 3.1 million dollars to expand AMDAHL'S benchmark center to accommo-
date the NFS benchmark. Additionally they were totally dependent on
I3M to provide some key equipment for which IBM quoted delivery lead
times of fourteen months. FDC/AMDAHL stated that "it is a well
documented fact that our principal competitor teaches its marketing
representatives to attempt to influence benchmarks into an area of
complexity and size which allows them to use their resources of computer
equipment, number of staff, and benchmarking expertise to create an
environment where no other vendor can succeed. This allows the dis-
qualification of all other vendors at the benchmark and prevents the
Government from taking advantage of the cost benefits associated with
competitive procurement." FDC/AMDAHL offered five alternative methods
of benchmarking the ITPS requirement which FDC/AMDAHL felt would allow
them to compete.
In March, FDC/AMDAHL wrote several additional letters to ADFSO
questioning and challenging different aspects of the solicitation
document. In a letter dated 2? March I98O FDC/AMDAHL stated that, "We
have still outstanding, a number of problems, which if uncorrected will
result in Federal Data submitting a bid which is unresponsive." FDC/
AMDAHL went on to request a delay in closing of the solicitation. The
Navy, concerned that a further delay past the already amended 31 March
1980 closing date, would not allow time for contract completion prior




On March 31, 1980 two proposals were received, one from IBM and
one from FDC/aMDAHL. FDC/AMDAHL also submitted a protest to the
General Accounting Office protesting certain terms and conditions
of the solicitation.
The detailed technical review of the proposals received was per-
formed by the director of the NFS computer center and the NFS systems
support group supervisor, both members of the SSE3. The technical
review team was unable to validate the FDC proposal. The proposal was
judged to contain sufficient deficiencies that only a complete rewrite
would allow the review team to validate and evaluate it. The IBM
proposal was evaluated as containing no technical deficiencies although
a number of issues remained unresolved. The unresolved issues were in
the form of clarifications or in the context of the relationship between
the specifications and the special provisions. It was judged that the
unresolved issues could be pursued during negotiations. 3y letter
dated 15 April I98O, Federal Data was informed that their proposal had
been determined unacceptable.
FDC/AMDAHL attempted to have ADPSO's determination, that their
proposal was unsuitable, overruled. It was unlikely that FDC /AMDAHL'S
under the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 the Comptroller
General of the General Accounting Office (GAO) has the power to settle
and adjust government accounts. Since procurement involves the ex-
penditure of federally appropriated funds, GAO has asserted an extensive
role in the field of bid protests under which he may review in detail
the administrative procedures of federal agencies to determine whether
or not (in its procurement process) the agency has complied with the




formal protest to the General Accounting Office would result in a
ruling in their favor. In fact several Comptroller General
decisions supported proposal rejection when a proposal, such as the
one submitted by FDC/aMDAHL, provided a repetition of the requirement
as stated in the soliciation without a technical description of how
the vendor would fulfill those requirements. FDC/AMDAHL therefore
attempted to convince Navy and GSA officials in the ADPE approval
chain that ADPSO had conducted the procurement unfairly and should be
directed to re-open the solicitation. Their case suggested that
ADPSO' s administration of the procurement was flawed by three funda-
mental errors which violated the Delegation of Procurement Authority,
Defense Acquisition Regulations and General Accounting Office precedent,
FDC/AMDAHL set forth these errors in a letter to the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management) as follows:
"First
,
ADPSO arbitrarily excluded Federal Data
Corporation/AMDAHL from the procurement, thereby eliminating
IBM's only known competitor. This action violated the
Delegation of Procurement Authority ("DPA") which explicitly
recognized that the Navy's requirements would adversely
impact the scope of competition and therefore mandated
that the Navy conduct the Procurement so as to achieve the
maximum competition practical.
Despite the DPA's directive to achieve maximum
competition, ADPSO structured its original solicitation
so as to exclude all offerors but IBM. 3y its letters
of February lU and March 7, 19^0 , Amdahl advised ADPSO
that the stated requirement for a central processing
system prevented any offeror from bidding Amdahl units,
the only non-IBM equipment compatible with the mandated
software and of adequate size. This was because the
combination of Amdahl machines required to fulfill the
Postgraduate School's stated eight-year workload would
be loosely rather than tightly coupled and therefore
unable to run on one copy of the operating software.
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Thus, the only machine available to satisfy both the stated
workload and the single operating system requirement was an
I3M 3033 attached processor or multiprocessor.
Despite the fact that ADPSO was notified as early as
February 1*4, I98O, that its specifications totally
eliminated competition, it failed to remedy the situation
until March 25, 19^0, Just days before the closing date
for the receipt of proposals, and it refused to extend
the closing date to allow Amdahl or Federal Data to pre-
pare a bid. Thus, prior to March 25, 19&0, neither
Amdahl nor Federal Data could have prepared a proposal
capable of being deemed responsive to the mandatory
requirements, and they therefore did not expend the
substantial and costly (and obviously futile) effort
necessary to do so. After March 25, 19^0, Amdahl and
Federal Data were, at last, able to bid, but they were
arbitrarily ienied sufficient time to prepare a thorough
proposal for this complex procurement. I3M had more
than two and one-half months to complete its proposal:
Federal Data/Amdahl had only days to do so before the
March 31 closing date. ADPSO had every opportunity to
amend the offending restrictive specifications well in
advance of the closing date for proposals. In light of
the fact that ADPSO knew that no competition existed
without such an amendment, it acted irresponsibly by
failing to make the necessary modifications in a timely
manner. ADPSO compounded its error when it ignored
Federal Data's request for an extension and then rejected
as "unacceptable" Federal Data's timely but hastily
prepared submission.
Thus, ADPSO not only failed to conduct this procure-
ment on a competitive basis, but it completely eliminated
the only available competition from the outset.
Second
,
ADPSO failed to cancel the RFP and resolicit
all potential offerors after Amendment 0005 substantially
eliminated onerous and costly terms and conditions which
had precluded Amdahl and others from submitting proposals
initially as prime contractors. ADPSO 's failure to re-
solicit violated Defense Acquisition Regulation 3-805.'4(b)
and General Accounting Office precedent. Furthermore,
ADPSO' s decision not to restore competition by circulating
Amendment 0005 to all potential offerors was in derogation




ADPSO failed to cancel the RFP and resolicit
all potential offerors after Amendment 0006 vastly expanded
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the scope of this procurement. Again, ADPSO's decision
to share Amendment 0CC6 only with IBM, the sole remaining
offeror, constituted a violation of procurement regula-
tions and case law and revealed its unwillingness to
abide by the terms of the DPA."
The Navy's position in rebuttle of FDG/AMDAHL ' s allegations was
that the Navy had gone to extreme lengths to revise both the
mandatory specifications and the benchmark test to avoid any possible
restrictions on competition. Amendments 0001-000^4 were all generated
in response to concerns expressed by FDC/AMDAHL. Many concessions and
revisions were made to the benchmark test procedure to accommodate
logistical and other difficulties at the AMDAHL test center. A
special testing procedure was developed expressly for FDC/AMDAHL to
permit the testing of their loosely coupled multi-processor configura-
tion as two separate systems. These accommodations were made despite
their undesirability and the fact that they made performance comparison
with other offerors difficult. In a letter to the General Accounting
Office the Navy stated, "FDC/aMDAHL had received unmistakable indica-
tions from the Navy by 26 February 1980 that they would not be prevented
from responding in this procurement. The requirement for a single-
system image was dropped in the meeting of 25 Feb. and confirmed by
FDC/AMDAHL in their letter of 26 Feb... In light of this, any
FDC/AMDAHL argument that they didn't have enough time to prepare a
proposal is specious. They had at least 30 days after resolution of
the 'single-system image' issue."
In response to the Assistant Commissioner of the Automated Data
and Telecommunications Service, the Navy stated, '*Ycu have raised the
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question of whether in view of the limited competition if it would
be desirable/proper to have the contracting officer reconsider and
allow the company to repair its proposal.
Our comments are:
a) Appropriate GAO cases state that when a technical
proposal is so deficient as to require a "rewrite",
the company should not be given a second "bite at
the apple".
b) Any attempt to change what is a correct decision
will to a considerable extent dilute the integrity
of the procurement process.
c) Although a single source is not the most desireable
situation to be in, it was arrived at properly and
must be accepted.
The only way to increase competition on this acquisition would
be to cancel the solicitation and readvertise. This is not acceptable
to the Navy. It would most likely expose the Navy to a substantial
claim for proposal costs."
The Navy later stated that changes made by amendment 0005 were
a consequence of negotiations with the sole remaining contractor
which after cost benefit analysis represented the best value to the
Government. Amendment 0006 established an estimated maximum ordering
quantity to limit the contractor's liability on this fixed price
requirements type contract. Only the initial configuration buy is
approved and funded. Any additional acquisitions under this contract
would come after the necessary funding and ADP review approvals have
been obtained for each proposed action.
3^4

General Automated Data and
Services Telecommunications
Administration Service Washington, DC 20^405
AUG 1 1979
Mr. G. A. Peappies
Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(Financial Management)
Department of ~he Navy
Washington, DC 20350
Dear Mr. Peappies:
Based on the justification appearing in your letter of April 20, 1979>
subsequent documentation and discussions between members of our
respective agencies, we are granting you a Delegation of Procurement
Authority (DPA) in respect to the acquisition of a replacement system
for an IBM 360/67 computer system located at the Navy Postgraduate
School, Moneterey, California.
This procurement shall be conducted on a competitive basis to the
maximum extent practical. We understand that your mandatory
specifications will require that all proposed systems be software
compatible with the existing systems and be capable of processing
your existing inventory of software without change.
Recognizing that this type of specification will have a severe impact
on the scope of competition, you are requested to insure that
definite steps are taken by the Navy Postgraduate School to avoid
such procurements in the future.
This DPA is subject to those limitations set forth in Enclosure I as
are validated by initials. Failure to operate within the established
limitations renders this DPA voidable. In particular, your attention is
invited to paragraph 10 of the referenced limitations which pertains to
statutory socio-economic procurement programs.
The acquisition action authorized by this DPA must be consummated




2Any future reference to this DPA should cite Case Number CDS-9-2UO,
Questions about this procurement or requests for assistance may be









On 5 January 1981 the General Services Administration announced
a complete revision to the procurement regulations governing
automatic data processing equipment acquisition. The revision provided
(for the first time since passage of the 3rooks Act in 1965) for
inclusion of software conversion costs. The revision stated,
"Full and open competition is a basic procurement objective
of the Government. The maximum practicable competition
among offerors who are capable of meeting the user's needs
will ensure that the Governments ADP needs are satisfied
at the lowest overall cost, price and other factors
considered, over the system life."
It went on to stare,
"Software conversion studies shall be performed for
all procurements to ensure that the users needs are
met at the lowest overall cost, price and other factors
considered, including the cost and other factors associated
with conversion activities."
The GSA revisions were greeted warmly by agency ADP procurement
officials who felt that they signaled a long overdue reduction of





This chapter contains a teaching note to be utilized in guiiing
student discussion of the case study presented in Chapter II.
^6

Naval Postgraduate School 198l
THE NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL COMPUTER ACQUISITION
TEACHING NOTE
Tliis case is an examination of an acquisition of a major computer
system. Although the situational facts relate to the Naval Postgraduate
School, broad issues are developed which apply universally to public
and private sector computer systems acquisition. The case exposes the
student to the issues of specification development, conversion costs,
benchmark testing, and the role of competition in computer acquisition.
Attention is focused on the environment in which a computer system need
is developed and how that need is "marketed" through the review and
support process of a large organizational buying system.
TEACHING OBJECTIVES
This case is intended for either graduate or advanced undergraduate
level courses in computer systems management or acquisition management.
The case illustrates the process utilized by the United States Govern-
ment in obtaining general purpose computer systems. In analyzing the
case the student must evaluate the contributions made by the numerous
organizations involved in overseeing federal computer acquisitions.
Underlying the acquisition process is the basic philosophy that
federal procurements should rely on full and open competition to obtain
required goods and services at fair and reasonable prices. This
This teaching note was prepared by LCDR J. E. Boyle of the
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.
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philosophy is shown to be in conflict with the best interest of the
government when replacing major computer systems. The costs of
converting application programs from one manufacturer's machine to
another are so high that they must be considered and, once recognized
they effectively eliminate free and open competition.
DISCUSSION QUESTIONS
1) What effect does the one year term of the D?A have on
the acquisition process?
2) Is it possible to have true competition in a computer
replacement? What are the longterm implications of
conversion costs for an organization buying its
initial computer?
3) What is the role of top management in a computer
acquisition?
h) What advantages does an incumbent vendor have in
obtaining a follow-on contract?
ANALYSIS AMD EVALUATION
The computer acquisition process can be viewed as being
comprised of five distinct phases:
1) the need for the ADP capability must be documented
and approved
2) detailed specifications and an evaluation plan must
be prepared
3) vendor proposals to meet stated specifications must
be solicited
k) vendor proposals must be evaluated in accordance
with the evaluation plan
5) the most advantageous proposal to the buyer is
selected and contract awarded
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Each of these phases in interrelated and interdependent. The
manner in which the needs are stated in phase one can have profound
impact on specification development, what the vendor can propose in
response to those specifications and ultimately which vendor will be
selected.
The following key terms /responses apply to the above discussion
questions. -Chalkboard terms for discussion. Question One;
-false deadline
-inflexible milestones
Utilization of a specific time period in which the acquisition
must be completed causes the buying agency to be inflexible when
asked to extend an established milestone. The process provides for
numerous levels of review which in themselves cause a considerable
delay prior to DPA approval. Fear of running out of time on the DPA,
and the inherent danger of having to "revisit" the approval chain,
can cause the buying agency to refuse milestone extensions on factors





Modern complex organizations have become dependent on computer
systems to process an enormous volume of information. As the complexity
of the organization increases so does its dependence on the computer.
Factors to consider before converting application programs (software)
include high labor/material costs, significant operational disruption
kl

and the possibility that the new system might not work. Fear of a new
vendor not being able to provide a fully capable system can cause the
buyer to establish specifications which limit or eliminate competition
in hope of retaining an incumbent vendor. By restricting the competi-
tion in this manner the buyer may not receive the price lowering
benefits of fall competition.
In cases where fall competition is desired, inclusion of extensive
conversion costs can effectively eliminate non- compatible vendors from
consideration. Buyers of computer systems should recognize that their





In a large undertaking, of such importance to an organization as
replacing its central computer system, two levels of mangement are
required. First, a daily operating level must exist with sufficient
authority and technical expertise to accomplish the routine requirements
of the process. Second, the top manager must, by his active interest,
show that the requirement has sufficient priority to compete success-
fully with other organizations requirements for resources. Invariably
hurdles are encountered by lower level managers which stop progress and
require intervention by the top manager. In these cases top level
assistance can result in expeditious resolution of what otherwise could




-early knowledge of requirement
-known comodity
-possibility to influence customer requirements
Clearly, ISM was able to take advantage of its position as the
incumbent contractor, and its extensive marketing organization to be
active in the impending NPS computer acquisition long before its
competitors. FDC/AMDAHL, with limited marketing resources, was not
aware of the acquisition until it was formally announced Just four
months prior to the proposal date. FDC/AMDAHL had to expend consider-
able effort during the relatively short proposal preparation time to
become familiar with the requirements and attempt to obtain changes in
the solicitation which would favor its system.
TEACHING PLAN
Discussion can be started with questions about the contributions
of the various agencies involved in the acquisition process. This is
primarily for eliciting the students ' feelings as to the complicated
nature of the process utilized in replacing government computers. One
may ask, for example, whether the General Services Administration (GSA)
is accomplishing its responsibilities under the Brooks Act? Dees GSA
contribute to the economic and efficient procurement of ADPE in the
Federal Government?
The discussion should continue to examine the impact of conversion
costs. Useful questions would include, what costs should be considered
when estimating conversion? What would be the impact of ignoring these




Having established the complicated nature of the process and
the substantial impact of conversion costs, discussion should be
focused on how each of the principals involved with the Postgraduate
School computer acquisition acted within the process to achieve their
objectives. The students should be asked to offer their opinions as
to what each principal (Postgraduate School, GSA, NAVDAC, ADPSO,
FDC/AMDAHL, IBM) had as its objective, and how successful it was in
attaining that objective.
The students can then offer their decision on whether or not the
DPA should be revoked, giving their justification for the chosen
action. Finally discussion should focus on what factors in the
acquisition process could be improved, and what actions can be




1. U. S. General Accounting Office Report, "Continued Use of Costly,
Outmoded Computers in Federal Agencies Can Be Avoided, " AFMD-81-9,
15 December I98O.
2. U. S. General Accounting Office Report, "Conversion: A Costly,
Disruptive Process That Must 3e Considered When Buying Computers,
"
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